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Abstract  
This paper examines the concept of development and the implication 
it has for moral education. While using the word “development” in 
its general understanding as change from one stage to the other, it 
went beyond this to the psychological. It alludes that in terms of 
moral education, development is not just any behaviour change, but 
a change toward greater differentiation, integration, and adaptation. 
In other words, that development as a movement through a 
sequential progression represents movement from a less adequate 
psychological state to a more adequate psychological state. Using 
the method of analysis and description, it came to the conclusion that 
education for moral and general cognitive development must be 
judged by its contribution to a more general concept of ego-
development.  
 
Development in Perspective 
The developmental-philosophic strategy in contrast with some other 
approaches can deal with two persistent problems: the ethical 
question of having a standard of non-relative or universal value and 
factual questions of prediction. The concept of development, as 
elaborated by cognitive-developmental theory, implies a standard of 
adequacy internal to, and governing, the developmental process 
itself (Udokang 2010). It is obvious that the notion of development 
must do more than merely define what comes later in time. This is so 
because it is not clear that what comes later must be better. For 
example, if anal interests mature later in time than oral interests, this 
in itself is no reason for claiming that the anal interests are better 
than the oral interests. 
Cognitive-developmental theory, however, postulates a 
formal internal standard of adequacy which is not merely an order of 
events in time. In doing so it elaborates the ordinary-language 
meaning of the term “development”. Webster’s Dictionary tells us 
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that to develop means “to make active, to move from the original 
position to one providing more opportunity for effective use, to 
cause to grow and differentiate along lines natural of its kind; to go 
through a process of natural growth, differentiation, or evolution by 
successive changes.” This suggests an internal standard of adequacy 
governing development; it implies that development is not just any 
behaviour change, but a change toward greater differentiation, 
integration, and adaptation. Cognitive-developmental psychological 
theory postulates that movement through a sequential progression 
represents movement from a less adequate psychological state to a 
more adequate psychological state. The existence of this “internal 
standard of adequacy” is suggested by studies which show that the 
child prefers thinking at the next higher moral or logical stage to 
thinking at his own stage (or at lower stages) (Rest 86-109) and that 
he moves in that direction under normal conditions of stimulation. 
The concept of development also implies that such an 
internal standard of adequacy is different from notions of adaptation 
based on culturally relative success or survival. As a case, we may 
take stages of morality. Being at the highest moral stage led Socrates 
and Martin Luther King to be put to death by members of their 
culture. Obviously, then, moral development cannot be justified as 
adaptive by standards of survival or of conformity to cultural 
standards. In terms of developmental psychological theory, however, 
Luther’s morality was more adequate than the morality of most 
people who survive longer. Formally, Luther’s morality was a more 
differentiated and integrated moral system than that of most people. 
It was more adequate because if all people adopted Luther’s 
morality, it would resolve for everyone moral problems and conflicts 
unresolved by lower-stage moralities (Cochrane et al, 107). 
As the example of Luther suggests, the formal standard of 
cognitive developmental psychological theory is not itself ultimate, 
but must be elaborated as a set of ethical and epistemological 
principles and justified by the method of philosophy and of ethics. 
The distinctive feature of the developmental-philosophic approach is 
that a philosophic conception of adequate principles is coordinated 
with a psychological theory of development and with the fact of 
development. 
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In contrast to “value free” approaches, the approach 
suggested by Dewy and Piaget considers questions of value or 
adequacy at the very start. Piaget begins by establishing 
epistemological and logical criteria for deciding which thought 
structures are most adaptive and adequate for coping with 
complexity. Similarly, most works on ethical stages have taken a 
philosophic notion of adequate principles of justice (represented 
especially in the work of Kant and Rawls) as guide in defining the 
direction of development. Epistemological and ethical principles 
guide psychological inquiry from the start. Thus, this strategy 
attempts to avoid the naturalistic fallacy of directly deriving 
judgments of value from judgments about the facts of development, 
although it assumes that the two may be systematically related. It 
takes as a hypothesis for empirical confirmation or refutation that 
development is a movement toward greater epistemological or 
ethical adequacy as defined by philosophic principles of adequacy. 
Our philosophical method differs from the approaches of 
philosophers of other persuasions in that the developmental method 
is partly empirical rather than purely analytic. It combines a prior 
conception of development with a prior notion of an ethical standard 
of adequacy: but these notions can be revised in the light of the facts, 
including the facts of development. If the facts of development do 
not indicate that individuals move toward philosophically desired 
principles of justice, then the initial philosophic definition of the 
direction of development is in error, and must be revised. The 
analytic and normative “ought” of the developmental philosophers 
must take into account the facts of development, but it is not simply 
a translation of these facts.  
This method of “empirical” or “experimental” philosophy is 
especially central for an educational philosophy prescribing 
educational aims. But philosophical principles cannot be stated as 
ends of education until they can be stated psychologically. This 
means translating them into statements about a more adequate stage 
of development. Otherwise the rationally accepted principles of the 
philosopher will only be arbitrary concepts and doctrines for the 
child. Accordingly, to make a genuine statement of an educational 
end, the educational philosopher must coordinate notions of 
principles with understanding for the facts of development. 




Development as the Aim of Education 
So far we have attempted to clarify and justify the basic claim that 
developmental criteria are the best ones for defining educationally 
important behaviour changes. We need now to clarify how the 
psychological study of development can concretely define 
educational goals. A common criticism is that the concept of 
development is too vague to clarify genuinely the choice of the 
curricular content and aims of education. A second, related criticism 
is that the concept of development, with its connotation of the 
“natural,” is unsuited to determine actual educational policy. 
These require to be examined. With regard to the issue of 
vagueness, if the concept of development is to aid in selecting 
educational aims and content, this assumes that only some behaviour 
changes out of many can be labeled developmental. We need to 
justify this assumption and to clarify the conditions for 
developmental change. 
Our position here has been challenged by Bereiter, who 
claims that determining whether or not a behaviour change is 
developmental is a matter of theory, not an empirical issue (Bereiter 
25-32). For example, Piagetian research shows that fundamental 
arithmetical reasoning (awareness of one-to-one correspondence of 
inclusion of a larger class in a sub-class, of addition and subtraction 
as inverse operations), usually develops naturally, without formal 
instruction or schooling, i.e., it constitutes development. Such 
reasoning can also be explicitly taught, however, following various 
non-developmental learning theories. Accordingly, says Bereiter, to 
call fundamental arithmetical reasoning developmental does not 
define it as a developmental educational objective distinct from non-
developmental objectives like rote knowledge of the multiplication 
tables. 
 In answer, the cognitive-developmental position claims that 
developmental behaviour change is irreversible, general over a field 
of responses, sequential, and hierarchical (Kohlberg 40-48). When a 
set of behaviour changes meet all these criteria, changes are termed 
stages or structural reorganizations. A specific area of behavioural 
change like fundamental arithmetical reasoning may or may not 
meet these criteria. Engelmann claims to have artificially taught 
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children the “naturally developing” operation of conservation, but 
Kamii (1971) found that the children so taught met Engelmann’s 
criteria of conservation without meeting the criteria of development, 
e.g., the response could be later forgotten or unlearned, it was not 
generalized, and so forth. 
When a set of responses taught artificially do not meet the 
criteria of natural development this is not because educational 
intervention is generally incompatible with developmental change. It 
is because the particular intervention is found to mimic development 
rather than to stimulate it. The issue of whether an educational 
change warrants the honorific label “development” is a question for 
empirical examination, not simply a matter of theory. 
We have claimed that development can occur either 
naturally or as the result of a planned educational program. As was 
discussed earlier, development depends on experience. It is true, 
however, that the way in which experience stimulates development 
(through discrepancy and match between experienced events and 
information-processing structures) is not the way experience is 
programmed in many forms of instruction and educational 
intervention. It is also true that the kinds of experience leading to 
development must be viewed in terms of a stimulation which is 
general rather than highly specific in its content or meaning. 
Because the experiences necessary for structural 
development are believed to be universal, it is possible for the child 
to develop the behaviour naturally, without planned instruction. But 
the fact that only about half of the adult population fully reaches 
Piaget’s stage of formal operational reasoning and only five percent 
(5%) reach the highest moral stage demonstrates that natural or 
universal forms of development are not the inevitable but depend on 
experience (Kuhn et al 1971). 
If this argument is accepted, it not only answers the charge 
that development is a vague concept but helps answer the charge that 
there are kinds of development (such as growth in skill at burglary) 
which are not valuable. Such questionable types of “development” 
do not constitute development in the sense of a universal sequence 
or in the sense of growth of some general aspect of personality. As 
stated by Dewey:  
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That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar … 
cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of 
growth as education and education as growth the 
question is whether such growth promotes or retards 
growth in general (75). 
While a coherent argument has been made for why universal 
developmental sequences define something of educational value, we 
need to consider why such sequences comprise the ultimate criteria 
of educational value. We also need to consider how they relate to 
competing educational values. How does universal structural 
development as an educational aim relate to ordinary definitions of 
information and skills central to the educational curriculum? It 
seems obvious that many changes or forms of learning are of values 
which are not universals in development. As an example, while 
many unschooled persons have learned to read, the capacity and 
motivation to read does not define a developmental universal; 
nonetheless, it seems to us a basic educational objective. We cannot 
dispose of “growth in reading” as an educational objective as we can 
“growth in burglary,” simply because it is not a universal in 
development. But we argue that the ultimate importance of learning 
to read can only be understood in the context of more universal 
forms of development. Increased capacity to read is not itself a 
development, although it is an attainment reflecting various aspects 
of development. The value or importance of reading lies in its 
potential contribution to further cognitive, social, and aesthetic 
development. 
 A developmental definition of educational objectives must 
not only cope with competing objectives usually defined non-
developmentally, but with the fact that the universal aspects of 
development are multiple. Here, as in the case of evaluating non-
developmental objectives, the progressive educator must consider 
the relation of a particular development to development in general. 
As an example, Kamii has defined a program of preschool 
intervention related to each of the chapter headings of Piaget’s 
books: space, time, causality, number, classification, and so on 
(1971). Kamii’s intention in making use of all the areas of cognitive 
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development discussed by Piaget is not to imply that each constitutes 
a separate, intrinsic educational objective. Rather, her interest is to 
make use of all aspects of the child’s experience relevant to general 
Piagetian cognitive development. Such a concept of generalized 
cognitive-stage development is meaningful because Kohlberg and 
DeVries and others have shown that there is a general Piagetian 
cognitive-level factor distinct from psychometric general 
intelligence (1971). 
In contrast to the psychometric concept of intelligence, the 
developmental level concept of intelligence does provide a standard 
or a set of aims for pre-school education. It does not assume a 
concept of fixed capacity or “intelligence quotient” constant over 
development. In this sense, developmental level is more like 
“achievement” than like “capacity,” but developmental level tests 
differ from achievement tests in several ways. While the 
developmental level concept does not distinguish between 
achievement and capacity, it distinguishes between cognitive 
achievement (performance) and cognitive process (or competence). 
Developmental tests measure level of thought process, not the 
difficulty or correctness of thought product. They measure not 
cognitive performance but cognitive competence, the basic 
possession of a core concept, not the speed and agility with which 
the concept is expressed or used under rigid test conditions. 
Psychometric and developmental level concepts of 
intelligence are quite different. In practice, however, the two kinds 
of measures are highly correlated with one another, explaining why 
clear theoretical and operational distinctions between the two 
concepts of intelligence have not been made until recently. Factor-
analytic findings now can provide an empirical basis for this 
distinction (Kamii 1971). While psychometric measures of general 
intelligence and of “primary mental abilities” at mental age six 
correlate with Piagetian measures of cognitive level, there is also a 
common factor to all developmental level tests. This factor is 
independent of general intelligence or of any special psychometric 
ability. In other words, it is possible to distinguish between 
psychometric capacity and developmental level concepts or 
measures of intelligence. Given the empirical distinction, cognitive 
stage measures provide a rational standard for educational 
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intervention where psychometric intelligence tests do not. This is 
true for the following reasons: 
(i) The core structure defined by stage tests is 
in theory and experiment more amenable to 
educational intervention – Piagetian theory 
is a theory of stage movement occurring 
through experience of structural 
equilibrium.  
(ii) Piagetian performance predicts later 
development independent of a fixed 
biological rate or capacity factor, as 
demonstrated by evidence for longitudinal 
stability or prediction independent of I.Q. 
Because Paiget items define invariant 
sequences, development to one stage 
facilitates development to the next. 
(iii) Piagetian test content has cognitive value in 
its own right. If a child is able to think 
causally instead of magically about 
phenomena, for instance, his ability has a 
cognitive value apart from arbitrary cultural 
demands – it is not a mere indicator of 
brightness, like knowing the word 
“airplane” or “confidence.” This is reflected 
in the fact that Piaget test scores are 
qualitative; they are not arbitrary point on a 
curve. The capacity to engage in concrete 
logical reasoning is a definite attainment; 
being at mental age six is not. We can ask 
that all children have high I.Q.’s. 
(iv) This cognitive value is culturally universal, 
the sequence of development occurs in 
every culture and subculture. 
The existence of a great level factor in cognitive 
development allows us to put particular universal sequences of 
cognitive development into perspective as educational aims. The 
worth of a development in any particular cognitive sequence is 
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determined by its contribution to the whole of cognitive 
development. 
We must now consider the relation of developmental aims of 
education to the notion of developmental acceleration as an 
educational objective. We indicated that a concept of stages as 
“natural” does not mean that they are inevitable; many individuals 
fail to attain the higher stages of logical and moral reasoning. 
Accordingly, the aim of the developmental educator is not the 
acceleration of development but the eventual adult attainment of the 
highest stage. In this sense, the developmentalist is not interested in 
stage-acceleration, but in avoiding stage retardation. Moral 
development research reviewed elsewhere suggests that there is what 
approaches an optimal period for movement from one stage to the 
next (Kohlberg 1976, 31-53). When a child has just attained a given 
stage, he is unlikely to respond to stimulation toward movement to 
the next stage. In addition, after a long period of use of a given stage 
of thought, a child tends to “stabilize” at that stage and develops 
screening mechanisms for contradictory stimulation. Accordingly, it 
has been found that both very young and very old children at a given 
stage (compared to the age-norm for that stage) are less responsive 
or less able to assimilate stimulation at the next higher stage than 
children at the age-norm for that age. The notion of an “open period” 
is not age-specific, it is individual. A child late in reaching Stage 2 
may be “open” to Stage 3 at an age beyond that of another child who 
reached Stage 2 earlier. Nevertheless, gross age-periods may be 
defined which are “open periods” for movement from one stage to 
the next. Avoidance of retardation as an educational aim means 
presenting stimulation in these periods where the possibility for 
development is still open. 
We need to consider a related distinction between 
acceleration and decalage as an aim of education. Piaget 
distinguishes between the appearance of a stage and its “horizontal 
decalage,” its spread pf generalization across the range of basic 
physical and social actions, concepts, and objects to which the stage 
potentially applies. As a simple example, concrete logic or 
conservation is first noted in the concept of mass and only later in 
weight and volume. Accordingly, acceleration of the stage of 
concrete operations s one educational enterprise and the 
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encouragement of decalage of concrete reasoning to a new concept 
or phenomenon is another. It is the latter which is most relevant to 
education. Education is concerned not so much with age of onset of 
a child’s capacity for concrete logical thought, but with the 
possession of a logical mind – the degree to which he has organized 
his experience or his world in a logical fashion. 
It is likely that the occurrence of such horizontal decalage, 
rather than age of first appearance of concrete operations, predicts to 
later formal operational thought. Formal reasoning develops because 
concrete reasoning represents a poor, though partially successful, 
strategy for solving many problems. The child, who has never 
explored the limits of concrete reasoning and lives in a world 
determined by arbitrary unexplained events and forces, will see the 
limits of the partial solutions of concrete logic as set by intangible 
forces, rather than looking for a more adequate logic to deal with 
unexplained problems. 
We have so far discussed development only as general 
cognitive development. According to cognitive-developmental 
theory there is always a cognitive component to development, even 
in social, moral and aesthetic areas. Development, however, is 
broader than cognitive-logical development. One central area is 
moral development, as defined by invariant stages of moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg 1971). On the one hand, these stages have a 
cognitive component; attainment of a given Piaget cognitive stage is 
a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the parallel moral 
stage. On the other hand, moral reasoning stages relate to action; 
principled moral reasoning has been found to be a precondition for 
principles moral actions (Kohlberg 1976, 31-53). The stimulation of 
moral development through the stages represents a rational and 
ethical focus of education related to, but broadening, an educational 
focus upon cognitive development as such.
13
Programs effective in 
stimulating moral development have been successfully demonstrated 
(Blatt 1975, 129-161). 
While developmental moral education widens the focus of 
cognitive-developmental education beyond the purely cognitive, 
there is a still broader unity, called ego-development, of which both 
cognitive and moral development are part (Loevinger, 1970). 
Particularly in the earlier childhood years, it is difficult to 
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distinguish moral development from ego-development. Cognitive 
development, in the Piagetian sense, is also related to ego 
development, since both concern the child’s core beliefs about the 
physical and social world. Much recent research demonstrates that 
the development of the ego as attitudes and beliefs about the self, 
involves step-by-step parallel development of attitudes and beliefs 
about the physical and social world. Further, it indicates definite 
stages of ego-development, defined by Loevinger et al. (1970), van 
den Daele (1970, 296-304) and others, which imply step-by-step 
parallels to Piaget’s cognitive stages, although they include moral 
social emotional content. In general, attainment of a Piagetian 
cognitive stage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
attainment of the parallel ego stage. All children at a given ego stage 
must have attained the parallel cognitive stage, but not all children at 
a cognitive age will have organized their self-concept and social 
experience at the corresponding ego stage. Thus, a general concept 
of ego-development as a universal sequential phenomenon is 
becoming an empirically meaningful guide to defining broad 
educational objectives. Furthermore, experimental educational 
programs to stimulate ego-development have been piloted with some 
definite success at both the preschool and the high school levels 
(Daele 1970, 911-924). 
Thus education for general cognitive development, and 
perhaps even education for moral development, must be judged by 
its contribution to a more general concept of ego-development. In 
saying this, we must remember that “Ego –development” is the 
psychologist’s term for a sequence which also must have a 
philosophic rationale. One pole of ego-development is self-
awareness; the parallel pole is awareness of the world. Increasing 
awareness is not only “cognitive,” it is moral, aesthetic, and 
metaphysical; it is the awareness of new meanings in life. 
Finally, we need to note that in the realm of ego-
development, a focus upon “horizontal decalage” rather than 
accelerated is especially salient. The distinction reflects in a more 
precise, and viable fashion the concern of maturational or romantic 
stage theorists for an educational focus upon “healthy” passage 
through stages, rather than their acceleration. In maturational 
theories of personality stages, age leads to a new stage regardless of 
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experience and organizations at previous stages. As a result, 
education and experience become valuable not for movement to a 
new stage, but for healthy or successful integration of the concerns 
of a stage. Onset of the next stage occurs regardless of experience; it 
is only integration of the stages which is contingent on experience 
and which should be the focus for education. Without accepting this 
contention, cognitive-developmental theory would agree that 
premature development to a higher ego stage without a 
corresponding decalage throughout the child’s world and life 
presents problems. In psychoanalytic maturational terms, the 
dangers of uneven or premature ego development are expressed as 
defects in ego-strength with consequent vulnerability to regression. 
In cognitive developmental terms, inadequate “horizontal decalage” 
represents a somewhat similar phenomenon. While the relation of 
“ego strength” to logical and moral decalage is not well understood, 
there are many reasons to believe they are related. A child who 
continues to think in magical or egocentric terms in some areas of 
cognition and morality is likely to be vulnerable to something like 
“regression” under stress later in life. 
 
Conclusion 
Let us conclude this paper by saying that if a broad concept of 
development, conceived in stage-sequential terms, is still vague as a 
definer of educational ends, it is not due to the inherent narrowness 
or vagueness of the concept. Rather, it is due to the fact that 
researchers have only recently begun the kind of longitudinal and 
educational research needed to make the concept precise and 
useable. When Dewey advocated education as development most 
American educational psychologists turned to industrial psychology 
or to the mental health bag of virtues. If the results of the cognitive-
developmental research of the last decades are still limited, they 
indicate real promise for finally translating Dewey’s vision into a 
precise reality.  
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